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AUG 4 1952

Memorandum to the Deputy Chairman

July 29, 1952

Subject: The Ukrainians

I am informed that late in June the Ukrainian Rada had received a message from Ukrainians in the United States. In this message they suggested that the Rada discuss the possibilities of cooperation with the American Committee. Instead of this the local Ukrainian leaders got together and on June 25th came out with a blast at the American Committee. This was one of the most violent attacks on the work of our Committee that I have seen. All Ukrainians were prohibited from negotiating with our Committee and anyone disobeying this order would be denounced as a traitor to the fatherland. (The resolution is attached hereto.)

I was very much surprised when a short while later information reached me that some important Ukrainians had expressed a desire to talk to me. The first one I met was Mr. Kotorovich, a friend of Dolenko, who had conversations with [] and who intends to go to America to call a conference of his Peasants Party. Dolenko is not a member of the Rada, but is close to all its leaders. He would like to work with the American Committee if the Rada would not oppose such cooperation. Kotorovich started by telling me that the Ukrainians received word that as a result of many talks with American senators and representatives, Admiral Kirk had decided to change the policies of the Committee in accordance with the wishes of the Ukrainians. Because of his russophile ideas, [] was forced to resign. I assured him that [] resignation had nothing to do with the Ukrainians and that he told me long ago that he intended to resign. I also told Kotorovich that no change in policies was contemplated, and could not be, because if we were to acknowledge the independence of the Ukraine, as he suggested, how could we expect to get the Russians into the Center. He expressed his friendship for the Russians and agreed that no general Center should be formed without the Russians. Our conversation lasted for about two hours and became very friendly. I realized that he was feeling me out and I presented our case along the lines of Admiral Kirk's speeches. He told me to disregard the denunciations of June 25th which were meant for internal consumption, but did not represent the real thoughts of the Ukrainian leaders. He asked me if I would be willing to meet Mr. Lewitsky — the son of the President and himself one of the chief leaders of the Ukrainians — privately and in secret. I agreed and he told me that he would contact me later.

A couple of days later a Mr. Bushman asked me for an appointment and came to see me. I knew Mr. Bushman before. He was born in the Ukraine, but does not consider himself a Ukrainian. He has been working among the Ukrainians for years, is close to many of their leaders, and is anxious to get them into our future Center. He knew of my talks with Kotorovich from the latter, told me that I made a very good impression and that Mr. Lewitsky and some

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DATE 2005

other leaders would like to have a talk with me. I asked him to explain the inconsistency of the attack on the Committee of June 25th and of the desire to talk with us. He explained it to me in this way. All the responsible Ukrainian leaders realize that the ideas they express in print have no basis in actual conditions in their fatherland. They don't believe that there is a strong separatist movement in the Ukraine and are, therefore, very anxious to cooperate with us and with the Russians. However, all of them are reluctant to come out in the open with such proposals. He related to me the long reign of banderist terror in camps, of the attack on Gulai, etc. As a result, everybody is scared to come out openly in support of the policies of the American Committee and hopes that somebody else will have enough courage to join the Committee, and then they would all follow him. On June 25th every leader tried to hit the Committee hardest so as not to be suspected of a desire to cooperate with it. Their desire now was to find a way to cooperate with us without endangering their lives and to find a face-saving formula for such cooperation.

More than a week passed before Kotorovich called me at my home. He told me that he was sorry that my meeting with Lewitsky had to be postponed because they had heard that I talked to their Prime Minister, Baran, in Paris and they want to find out from Baran the result of my conversation. I assured Kotorovich that although I had been in Paris, I had not talked to Baran. He said that it was too bad that he was misinformed, but that as he was leaving for a week, the conversation could only take place after his return.

The next day Bushman asked to see me at my home and told me that the Rada had delegated five leaders of its major parties, including Lewitsky and Bagrayanni, to talk to me about participating in the work of the Committee. The date was set for yesterday, but meanwhile they received a copy of Secretary Chapman's speech to the Ukrainian Congress in New York. This changed the whole outlook. The Ukrainians get the idea that the speech meant a change in the policies of the United States Government with respect to the various nationalities of the Soviet Union and that our Committee would also have to change its attitude. I explained to Bushman that in America even members of the government had the right to express their private views without making them the official policy of the government. I pointed out the difference between the cabinet system in Europe, where a minister as a member of the cabinet had to express its views, and the American system. Bushman told me that even if I succeeded in convincing the Ukrainian leaders of the truth of my explanation, still they would now be reluctant to come to our side because the extremists would attack them for such a step at the time when there were signs that the American Government was changing its

policies in the favor of the Ukrainians. The extremists will insist that Secretary Chapman's speech meant a change in American policy. While a week ago, Bushman assured me, he had been very optimistic about the possibility of an agreement with the Ukrainians, now after the speech he was rather pessimistic. The Ukrainians are now much less disposed to compromise. It is too bad that the Chapman speech appeared at this time, but there is nothing that we can do about it. It seems that the Ukrainians are now willing to join in the radio work, but are anxious to stay out of the Center. Such arrangement is unacceptable to us. We discussed ways to bring the Ukrainians into our Center. The Rada, as a governing body, cannot join the Center comprising political parties, but might create a new organization, or give its blessing to an established one, to enter the Center. Such an arrangement, if it can be attained, would be satisfactory. Dolenko's group may do the trick. However, I am afraid that the Ukrainians will insist upon being admitted to the radio commission without joining the Center.

Bushman made a surprising statement. He said that even a year ago a federalist Ukrainian party would have been admitted to the Rada and through that party cooperation with the American Committee could have been established. Even now this is not beyond possibility, but especially after Chapman's speech, very doubtful. I don't know whether this statement was inspired, but to me such an arrangement seems to be quite improbable after the violent attacks on the Federalists. On the other hand, our Committee was also attacked and still attempts are made to negotiate with us.